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I.  Institutions and Behaviour 
People want to be in control. This at least is a cultural trait of modern Western civilisations. By 
definition, the non-conscious mental apparatus is not under (direct) conscious control. In the past 
this has led to exorcism, aiming at liberating the victim from the foreign being by which it is 
possessed. Freudian psychoanalysis sees the subconscious as the source of serious mental disor-
der. This paper adopts a more pragmatic perspective. Like any human ability, the non-conscious 
mental apparatus is assumed to serve a function that, at least in the past when the neuronal struc-
ture underlying it has developed, gave human genes an evolutionary advantage. Actually, the 
paper tries to demonstrate that this advantage is large, and that it persists. However, what is 
beneficial in most contexts can be dysfunctional in others. It can be in the best interest of the in-
dividual, and of society for that matter, to exploit the power of intuition, or to prevent intuitive 
decision making from doing harm, depending on the specific context. To that end, the individual 
can design its own decision aids. It can voluntarily seek the support of a coach, or of technology. 
Yet modern societies do not always wait for that. Formal and informal institutions impose them-
selves. The intention can be paternalistic. They can aim at curing a perceived social ill. Or they 
can merely exert power to exploit those who are under their spell. 
There are many reasons why institutional designers ought to be cautious. Many institutions are 
informal, and informal institutions frequently emerge, rather than being purposefully designed 
(Hodgson 1988). Likewise, the target of institutional intervention, human behaviour, is usually 
socially embedded (Granovetter 1985). In order to be effective, institutional intervention must 
therefore set in motion a learning process in its addressees (Engel 2004b). Those deciding on the 
introduction of new institutions are usually not disinterested (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). This 
does not necessarily imply that existing formal institutions miss their stated purpose of social 
betterment. But they are likely to pick those solutions that give well organised political forces a 
distributional advantage (Knight 1992). Once the legislator has promulgated a new rule, it is 
handed over to the legal system. Like any subsystem of society, the legal system will apply its 
own internal logic, which may well be at variance with the original political intention (Teubner 
1989). Conversely, institutional addressees have the ability to creatively mute the institution 
(Wegner 1997). 
Despite of all these caveats, in modern industrialised countries, the legislator produces thousands 
of new rules in a year. If there is a written constitution, and a Supreme Court to enforce it, the 
legislator must be able to defend any new intervention into freedom or property. It must be able 
to tell a consistent story why there is a social problem, and how it is solved by the intervention. 
Such stories also help in generating political support. Moreover, seeing a new bill through to 
adoption requires a lot of zeal, and may well be costly, e.g. in terms of log-rolling. One must as-
sume a high degree of illusionary thinking to claim that all or at least most of this activity misses 
the point. If institutions are, at least in principle, effective, institutional designers want to recon-
struct them as governance tools, curing a (perceived) social ill. 
   3
Traditionally, social problems are reconstructed as incentive problems. Individually, institutional 
addressees are better off if they behave in a socially detrimental way. Institutional intervention 
realigns individual with social well-being. This reconstruction relies on rational choice theory. 
Rational choice theory has been exposed to two lines of criticism. The first line focuses on be-
havioural assumptions (Kahneman and Tversky 2000). It accepts rational choice theory to be the 
norm and is interested in the question whether human decision-makers live up to this norm. It 
thus explores a potential gap between the norm and the neuronal and psychological algorithms 
by which human decision-makers try to implement the norm. Actually it is only in this outside 
perspective that rational choice theory advances to a behavioural norm. In positive economic 
theory it is only a conceptual tool. Neoclassical economists do not claim that people truly take 
decisions in accordance with the axioms of rational choice theory. They only make this assump-
tion to understand how behaviour responds to changes in the opportunity structure (Friedman 
1953).  
The second line of criticism focuses on the norm. It is an established piece of wisdom from nor-
mative philosophical theory that all norms for good behaviour ultimately rest in a specific con-
struction of reality (Kersting 1994). The critics of rational choice theory claim that this theory 
assumes an inappropriately certain world (Gigerenzer, Todd et al. 1999). Rational choice theory 
only works if individuals interact in a relatively certain world. At the minimum, all interacting 
must hold the same beliefs about how their interaction partners reconstruct the situation (Savage 
1954). Usually, rational choice models assume a well-defined problem. They exclude situations 
of ignorance (Kirzner 1994), usually also situations of uncertainty. In rational choice theory, a 
situation is called uncertain if the problem space is well-defined, but there is uncertainty about 
the probabilities attached to each potential state of nature. If probabilities are known, this is 
called risk (Knight 1921). In situations of risk, expected values may be calculated. 
If one properly accounts for the non-conscious mental abilities, the first line of criticism is con-
siderably weakened. Specifically, at the non-conscious level, human decision-makers have many 
more cognitive resources at their disposition. However, the second line of criticism gets addi-
tional support. Not only is rational choice theory an inadequate reconstruction of decisions in a 
fundamentally uncertain world. Many features of the non-conscious mental apparatus are highly 
functional precisely if the individual has to routinely decide on an incomplete factual basis. In 
the following, both stories shall be sketched. 
II.  The Incentive Story 
II.1  Social Problems are Dilemma Situations 
The incentive story is epitomised by the prisoner's dilemma. Everyone is best off if others con-
tribute to the public good, while she gets a free lunch. Writing C for contribution, and D for de-
fection, and using the first letter for one's own action, and the second for the action of others, in a 
prisoner’s dilemma each individual holds the following preferences:   4
DC > CC > DD > CD 
This constitutes the following game: 
 contribution  defection 
contribution 2,2  0,3 





The numbers in the cells are the players’ payoffs, where the first number is the payoff of the row 
player, and the second number the payoff of the column player. Payoffs are represented ordi-
nally, i.e. by the rank in the respective player’s preference order. Best responses are underlined. 
An equilibrium (in pure strategies) presupposes that two best responses come together in one 
cell. The only cell for which this is true is the defection/defection cell. This is a dilemma since 
both players would be better off contributing. This would give both of them their second best 
outcome, rather than only the third best. However, if they only interact once, and if binding and 
enforceable agreements are not available, the parties miss this outcome. A combination of greed 
and fear leads to the socially detrimental result (Macy and Flache 2002). Greedy individuals try 
to get at their individually best outcome, the free lunch. Fearful individuals anticipate this, and 
defect because they do not want to be the sucker. 
Although game theorists rightly caution against the abuse of this model, it still captures the es-
sence of problems as diverse as climate change, arms races, or incentives for innovation in the 
absence of intellectual property (Hardin 1968). Relying on the sovereign forces of the state, insti-
tutional intervention is able to change a prisoner's dilemma so that the socially desirable result is 
achieved. There are several options for this. A tax may reduce the benefit from unilateral defec-
tion. A subsidy may increase the benefit from unilateral contribution. Those who have contrib-
uted may be given the enforceable right to exclude those from the benefit who have not. At a 
first stage, the players may be allowed to conclude a binding and enforceable contract (Baird, 
Gertner et al. 1994). 
II.2 Behavioural  Critique 
A prisoner's dilemma is a dilemma, because either player exclusively considers her own utility. 
In so doing, she is smart. She not only correctly assesses which outcome she expects in every 
possible state of the world. She also assumes that all others with whom she is interacting do the 
same. Given this assumption, she calculates a best response function. She finds her action by 
maximising over this function (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). In all but extremely simple games   5
this is a daunting intellectual task. For a long time, critics have objected that only daemons, not 
humans are able to perform the necessary intellectual operations (Simon 1957; Gigerenzer, Todd 
et al. 1999). Indeed, experimental evidence shows that untrained subjects violate all kinds of 
mathematical and statistical norms (Conlisk 1996).  
The critics have concluded that rational choice models are inappropriate to capture behaviour in 
real-life situations. They have suggested that individuals instead use radically simple decision 
rules, which they call heuristics. Heuristics deliberately ignore information. They often are lexi-
cographic. Decision makers go through predefined decision trees. They only go to lower 
branches if the criteria for taking a decision at a higher branch have been inconclusive. Nor-
mally, the criterion at each branch is just one cue. Similar rules tell the decision maker how 
much effort she should invest in searching for evidence. In order to keep this effort low, search 
usually is stopped early on (Gigerenzer 2004).  
II.3  Critique of the Critique 
If this is an accurate model of human decision-making, the implications for institutional design 
are profound (Gigerenzer and Engel 2006). But does the approach rest on an incorrect factual 
basis? Is the idea mistaken that human cognitive abilities are severely limited? Specifically, are 
the apparent limitations confined to conscious reasoning, whereas the non-conscious mental ap-
paratus offers so many resources that the quest for radically simple decision rules is no longer 
warranted? Does the heuristics approach suffer from aiming too high? Is the heuristics program 
only justified if the decision rule must remain the same if it is performed consciously? Is rational 
choice thus reinstalled, once one properly accounts for non-conscious abilities? Specifically, 
does rational choice theory turn out to have not only paramorphic, but even isomorphic quality 
(cf. Fischhoff, Goitein et al. 1981)? 
There is indeed evidence pointing into this direction. Psychologists have demonstrated that indi-
viduals take a large amount of evidence into account when deciding on a problem with multiple 
attributes (Glöckner 2007). Neuroscientists have shown that even monkeys carefully record in-
formation on cue validities, and that they use it in a way that can be modelled by one of the most 
demanding concepts of rational choice theory, Bayesian updating (Glimcher 2003). The human 
brain is much larger than the brain of monkeys. It is therefore highly plausible that human deci-
sion-makers do not only possess the same ability, but that they are even better at it. Anecdotal 
evidence supports this. If people did not possess a powerful non-conscious mental apparatus, 
speed reading would not be a possibility. In experts, a lack of conscious awareness is often taken 
to be a sign of professionalisation (Coward 2005:323). 
Before institutional intervention can be targeted to the non-conscious mental abilities, one 
should, of course, better understand them. Consciousness only speaks to mental awareness, 
which is a precondition for deliberate online control. It does not explain how the information is 
processed non-consciously. It seems that several inputs are processed in parallel. Parallel con-  6
straint satisfaction models explain decision-making the following way: the option is chosen that 
receives the highest activation, provided the system has reached a pre-defined level of stability, 
due to attempts at reducing local conflicts between positive and negative activation (Glöckner 
2007). To consciousness, only the result of this process is sent back. It is perceived as an intui-
tion. Here, much more knowledge is obviously needed. 
II.4  Implications for Institutional Design 
Even at this early stage, however, first implications for institutional design can be fleshed out. 
They point in two opposing directions. If the non-conscious mental apparatus is indeed so much 
more powerful than the conscious apparatus, institutions should see to it that, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, decision-makers are free to use the better mental machinery.  
For that purpose, sometimes it will be enough to just point them into the right direction. A pic-
ture says more than a thousand words, they say. Arguably this is due to the fact that pictures 
convey a lot of information at once that the non-conscious apparatus is able to handle properly. 
Specifically, pictures are able to inform about a complex relational graph, with no need to give 
an explicit definition of the individual relations. Normally, there is not much opposition to using 
pictures. It may suffice to encourage decision-makers to rely on their visualising skills. 
If information is processed non-consciously, however, those relying on this information give 
away control. They at most can use their guts to decide whether they feel comfortable with the 
resulting intuition. It may be necessary to train people that they should indeed trust their intui-
tions. This will likely not be appropriate in all circumstances. Institutions could therefore see to it 
that addressees gain expertise at the meta-level, learning about situations where intuitive deci-
sion-making is indeed best policy. The institutional arrangements for professional training may 
be read as doing exactly this. Moreover, accountability research shows that, with raising stakes, 
people work harder, but are not necessarily smarter (Wilson and Schooler 1991). They zero in on 
what they are good at doing. And they seek out for justifications should ambient risks materialise 
(Tetlock 1985). Where intuitive decision-making is socially desirable, institutions should there-
fore ostensibly not hold decision-makers liable. An example of this are rules that strictly limit the 
personal liability of public officials. Another example is the business judgement rule, that shields 
managers from personal liability (Hansen 1993). 
Conversely, although relying on intuition would be good for decision quality, institutional de-
signers may want to impose conscious decision making for competing normative reasons. If they 
do, they frequently face a dilemma. Furthering the competing goal comes at the cost of very 
likely deteriorating decision quality. Good institutional design ought to get this balance right. 
Nonetheless, intuitive decision-making may be unwanted. Institutional intervention may be 
meant to change the way how addressees take a decision, rather than (only) behavioural output 
(Engel and Weber 2006). The main three reasons for this are related to each other.    7
By definition, non-conscious decision-making is not under conscious control. Consequently, the 
person who has had the intuition is unable to convey to outsiders anything but the final outcome. 
At most, learning that one person has had a certain intuition may trigger the non-conscious for-
mation of the same intuition in an outsider. Otherwise they must trust the foreign intuition. In 
many contexts, this is deemed insufficient. For instance, most legal orders oblige judges to give 
explicit, written reasons for the decisions they are taking on behalf of the People (Engel 2004a). 
This is not only a measure of social hygiene. If their intuitions go unchecked, judges might – 
non-consciously – have been influenced by stereotypes and prejudices, rather than unbiased 
judgement. Same for legislators and regulatory agencies. And tort law effectively forces doctors 
to be able to give explicit reasons for the treatments they order. In the light of the scandals that 
led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, shareholders increasingly force Chief Executive Officers to give 
reasons for their business decisions as well.   
The second and third reasons become even stronger once one drops the assumption of a well de-
fined problem space. But even under the more restrictive assumption predictability and regulabil-
ity are an issue. The power of intuition then results from the fact that, non-consciously, large 
amounts of information may be processed in very little time (Kahneman and Frederick 2002). 
This information need not be taken online from the environment. It may be retrieved from mem-
ory. This makes it difficult for interaction partners to predict foreign intuition. They may have 
overlooked those of the many facets of the situation that have induced the decision maker to 
form a certain intuition. Even with perfect attention to the situation, it is impossible to second 
guess the elements of declarative memory that the decision-maker’s brain adds to the material 
from which it forms the intuition. One would have had to accompany the decision maker 
throughout her entire previous life. With imperfect prediction, social interaction becomes at least 
risky, if not impossible to bring about (Engel 2005). Of course, intuitive decision-making is not 
always and necessarily less predictable. An example to the contrary is behaviour guided by 
strong and persistent emotions, like vengeance. 
Predictability is also of utmost importance for regulation. Most social problems originate in hu-
man behaviour. Admittedly, there are exceptions. If a volcano bursts, one cannot hold a person 
liable. All one can do is putting in place an early alert system, and evacuate neighbouring regions 
once the alert system indicates present danger. However, an ever smaller part of institutions is 
meant to contain pure natural risk. Even risks as apparently natural as global warming are very 
likely to result from human behaviour. The large majority of problems addressed by institutions 
result from strategic interaction. They are thus purely human in origin.  
Whenever human behaviour is at least part of the explanation for the problem, regulators must 
get this behaviour right. They are in the business of prediction. Prediction is inevitable for the 
second component of institutional design: defining the precise shape of the institution itself. This 
presupposes anticipating how addressees will react to the intervention. If they use their intuition 
for the purpose, the intervention is bound to be only one out of many elements being processed. 
It is next to impossible for institutions to get addressees’ intuition under control. Understanding 
the non-conscious mental apparatus, therefore, radicalises an observation from the evolutionary   8
theory of institutions. The effect of institutional intervention is not only unpredictable if address-
ees, on purpose, try to creatively mute the impulse (Wegner 1997). The predictability problem 
already exists whenever addressees use their non-conscious mental apparatus.  
In appropriate contexts, institutional designers may respond by shifting to two-level governance. 
By a first intervention they induce addressees to keep their decision under full conscious control. 
The second intervention exploits the much better predictability for doing something about the 
underlying social problem. Visibly raising stakes is the most popular way to do this. The most 
drastic intervention to that end is holding managers liable under criminal law, as in the environ-
mental legislation of many countries (for an overview see O'Hear 2004). A justification require-
ment has a similar effect (Tetlock, Skitka et al. 1989). However, this strategy comes at a high 
price. Precisely since the non-conscious mental apparatus is so much more powerful, institu-
tional designers face a hard choice between higher predictability and better decision quality. 
While predictability is the most visible, it is not the only challenge to regulability resulting from 
intuition. By definition, only the final outcome becomes conscious. The mental process of form-
ing the intuition is beyond conscious control. It is therefore not a matter of willpower whether a 
person has an intuition, and which are its contents. The standard suggestion from rational choice 
theory for the design of institutions is mute. Raising stakes, be it via imposing sanctions or hand-
ing out subsidies, is pointless if the addressee is unable to control the target activity. Specifically, 
institutional designers would have to be sure that higher stakes do not only influence conscious 
decision-making, but find a way to impact on the non-conscious formation of an intuition. Pre-
paring for future intuitive decision-making may be easier to influence.  
This casts new light on the legal concept of negligence. Negligence is stricter than intent. A tort 
feasor, or a person bound by a contract, is not only sanctioned if she has violated her duty on 
purpose. She is also held liable if she could have been expected to prevent the violation from 
happening. It would make sense to at least partly reconstruct this as liability for not having prop-
erly trained one's intuitions. If this holds true, it has an important implication for institutional 
design. Since training intuitions takes time, effective institutional intervention must start early 
on. Institutional designers, and the political and legal constituencies controlling them, must be 
sufficiently patient. It is possible that additional institutions must see to it that the respective task 
is only performed by those who have undergone training. The institutional arrangements around 
the liberal professions may serve as an illustration. For instance, the training of future doctors is 
not confined to transmitting explicit knowledge. They are also sent to hospital, to practice under 
supervision. This is meant to imbue them with the implicit knowledge of the discipline (cf. on 
the distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge Cowan, David et al. 2000). 
While the non-conscious mental apparatus is able to handle a huge amount of information in 
very little time, it might well not be perfect. Even the many more resources must have their lim-
its. Take the following, deceptively simple problem. Two players interact. Each of them has 
three options. At every instance of interaction, the options of either player may therefore be 
combined in nine different ways. Each player may rank each of these nine outcomes differently.   9
This apparently simple structure already makes for  362880 ! 9 =  possible different games. It is 
possible that the human mind is able to solve problems as complex as this. The fact that people 
solve the travelling salesman problem so easily points into this direction. Doing so involves men-
tal operations in this order of complexity. But ultimately, there must be a limit. If each player has 
four options this already makes for  000 , 888 , 789 , 922 , 20 ! 16 =  combinations. Now interacting 
with just one other person that may order 4 items in her utility function in every possible way is 
not an outlandish situation. It is therefore highly likely that there are situations for which even 
the limitations of the non-conscious mental apparatus matter. 
It still seems to be largely unclear whether the non-conscious mental apparatus not only has 
quantitative, but also qualitative limitations. The question is related to a second one. Why has it 
given the human species an evolutionary advantage to develop the ability to consciously override 
the non-conscious apparatus? Does the non-conscious apparatus have too many degrees of free-
dom? A hint comes from twin studies. Twins tend to create more divergence than they would 
have generated, had they grown up in different places. Does the human mind thus suffer from an 
embarrassment of riches? Does the non-conscious apparatus lack the ability to self-programme, 
or to direct an active search for information? Is it too easily trapped by the surface structure of a 
problem, and risks to neglect what is already known about the underlying basic structure? Re-
lated to this: is it difficult for intuitive decision-making to ignore history and to decontextualise? 
Is intuition too good at finding an acceptable solution for the problem at hand, and does it run the 
risk of neglecting the consequences for future similar situations? Are institutions needed where 
the socially desirable outcome is counterintuitive? 
It probably is too early to build institutional interventions on any of these speculations. Until our 
knowledge about the limitations of the non-conscious mental apparatus has further advanced, 
these ideas may, however, at least serve as an additional explanation for interventions that are 
already found in institutional practice. The last point provides a good illustration for this. In prin-
ciple, the law of torts is an elegant institution. All the legislator has to do is to promulgate that 
tortfeasors are held liable, maybe with the restriction that they can be found negligent. What this 
general rule means in practice is, step-by-step, developed by the courts, in the light of concrete 
conflicts. Through this decentralised mechanism, much more local knowledge goes into the ac-
tual shaping of the rule. However, since the general rule, at least originally, is underspecified, the 
courts are likely to rely on their intuition when making it more concrete. Many have complained 
that this often creates a bias. In the interest of being fair with the victim, the courts generate rules 
that, for the general public, are overly stringent (Rachlinski 2000). It has been one of the hall-
marks of law and economics to teach the courts to see the long-term implications of negligence 
standards (Posner 2003). Thus far, this discussion has been using different language. But one 
might reconstruct the law and economics of torts as a tool for correcting intuitive decision-
making where it leads to socially undesirable results. 
Along the same lines, one may wonder whether institutions play a role in shaping the interaction 
between the intuitive and the deliberate mental apparatus. It has been claimed that the non-
conscious and the conscious, the intuitive and the deliberate, the parallel and serial are not tightly   10
separated from each other, but may interact (Strack and Deutsch 2004). Again it probably is too 
early to suggest new institutions for the socially more desirable fine tuning of this interaction. 
Suffice it to point to one existing institutional arrangement that may be reconstructed as doing 
exactly this. It goes to the core of the legal profession. Decision-making in court has been dem-
onstrated to heavily rely on „coherence-based reasoning“ (Simon 2004). Given the institutional 
framework, and the need to give explicit reasons for the decision taken in particular, one could 
not possibly claim that judges exclusively rely on their intuition. But it is also beyond doubt that 
legal decision-making is not just a matter of calculus. The legal method is hermeneutical. It asks 
the lawyer to match an overly rich reality to an abstract rule. Judges get at this syllogism by de-
liberating, permanently checking inputs and potential outcomes back with their intuition. In light 
of this, one may interpret the compulsory training of future lawyers, and the organisation of the 
court system, as tools for bringing about the socially desired interaction between intuition and 
deliberation. 
Finally, clever institutional design might be able to get at the best of both worlds. There might be 
interventions that leave enough room for the power of intuition, and nonetheless provide society 
with accountability, predictability and regulability. Again judicial procedure might provide an 
illustration. Judges are obliged to give explicit reasons for their decisions. But they are not 
obliged to report the mental process by which they have found the solution to the case. The sepa-
ration between the context of discovery and the context of representation might do the trick 
(Engel 2004a). It has been claimed that this is also how morality serves as a post hoc control of 
individual behaviour (Haidt 2001). If mere predictability is enough, standardising context might 
suffice, if certain intuitions predictably go with this context (Engel 2005). This might be due to 
the fact that the mental representation of the standardised setting is reliable. On this, obviously 
more experimental work is needed. 
III.  Navigating a Fundamentally Uncertain World 
III.1 Defining  Uncertainty 
As long as individuals have to make choices from a well-defined problem space, the (evolution-
ary) advantage of intuition boils down to a question of quantity. If individuals rely on their intui-
tion, they can muster many more resources for decision-making. The fact that the problem, or the 
socially desired solution, are complicated does not necessarily mean that the individual is unable 
to solve it. One only sees the full power of intuition if one drops the assumption that the problem 
space is well defined. Many problems individuals, and societies for that matter, have to solve are 
indeed ill-defined. Frequently, social problems are a moving target. At most, the institutional 
designer is able to show that today's state of the world is at variance with some accepted norma-
tive standard. Whether the problem persists in the future depends on a plurality of contextual 
factors about which the institutional designer can at best hold beliefs. By definition, the future is 
uncertain. Often, the reconstruction of the present state of affairs also stands on shaky grounds. If 
one needs time series information to show the existence of a problem, or to say something mean-  11
ingful about causality (Leamer 1983), the necessary data will often not be available. Things be-
come worse if individual events must be reconstructed. As court procedure demonstrates, true 
certainty is almost never achieved. As is well known, eyewitnesses are particularly unreliable. 
Memory decays over time, and is reconstructive rather than photographic in the first place 
(Sporer, Malpass et al. 1996). 
Moreover, even if, in a categorical sense, the problem is well-defined, it may nonetheless not be 
rigorously tractable. This statement holds even if one expects the non-conscious mental appara-
tus to be more powerful than it probably is. In the last section, the reader has been reminded of 
the fact that an instance of strategic interaction as simple as one having only two players, and 
only three options for each of them, already constitutes a set of  362880 ! 9 =  different games. 
This is not a degree of complexity modern personal computers would shy away from. But a 
game not more complicated than chess is no longer open to canonical analysis and decision-
making, although a chessboard does not have more than 64 fields. Of course, Deep Blue has 
been able to beat the world champion in chess 10 years ago. But in so doing, it did not simply 
use brute force. It worked with approximations, not with simple calculus
1. A limit of principle is 
reached once a problem is „NP-hard“, i.e. if, by calculus, the problem cannot be solved in de-
fined time, whatever the amount of resources used for calculation (Garey and Johnson 1979). 
This is already the case if the dependent variable is in the exponent, as in the following, decep-
tively simple, equation 
x a y =  
where a is a constant, and  ) (x f y = .  
Finally, for pragmatic reasons decision-makers may prefer to reduce mental effort and to solve 
problems in a non-canonical way, although this would in principle be possible. This is indeed 
what has been found in experiments (Oaksford and Chater 2001). In particular it seems that 
many people use trust, rather than any version of game theory, to decide upon action in situations 
of strategic interaction, even if they are experienced (Selten, Mitzkewitz et al. 1997). This may 
be a strategy to save mental resources for competing tasks. The strategy may also be triggered by 
time pressure. But it seems that, even beyond such cost-benefit-analysis, most people are „cogni-
tive misers“ (Tetlock, Skitka et al. 1989:633). 
III.2  Decision Making Adapted to a Fundamentally Uncertain World 
As has been explained, the remarkable power of the non-conscious mental apparatus casts some 
doubts on the first argument brought forward in support of the heuristics programme: cognitive 
limitations. However, the main argument has always been that most real-life problems are either 
ill-defined or NP-hard (Gigerenzer 2004). This second argument is not affected by the criticism. 
But the heuristics programme to date still suffers from a lacuna. By now, there is ample evidence 
                                        
1   http://www.research.ibm.com/deepblue/.   12
that fast and frugal heuristics can indeed perform surprisingly well, although the decision rule 
asks decision-makers to deliberately ignore most of the available information. However, this 
statement only holds if the appropriate heuristic is applied. Thus far, the heuristics programme is 
not able to say much about appropriateness, and even less about the way how people learn about 
it (but see Rieskamp and Otto 2006). Heuristics are good if and when they are „ecological“. 
They perform poorly if they are used out of domain (Engel 2006). Intuition provides the missing 
link. Defining the proper domain of a heuristic, and assessing whether the case at hand fits the 
definition, is bound to be an information rich activity. Precisely because intuition is able to han-
dle large amounts of information rapidly, it is possible that decision-makers apply a certain heu-
ristic where this indeed leads to good decisions.  
Actually, the power of intuition even goes beyond this. As will be explained in greater detail be-
low, decision-makers can use their intuition to match features from the environment to schemas 
(Bartlett 1932:199-204) and exemplars (Anderson 2000:350-352). In either concept, not each 
and every element from the description of the schema or the exemplar must be met by observa-
tion. Some may miss. It depends on the relevance of the missing element whether the case at 
hand is nonetheless assimilated to the domain of the heuristic. Intuition has a further advantage 
for the concept of heuristics. The result of the non-conscious processing can be made con-
sciously available. This opens up the possibility that decision-makers non-consciously check 
whether they dispose of an appropriate heuristic, and then apply it consciously. This fits the heu-
ristics programme, since this research has normally not specified whether the heuristic is applied 
consciously or not, and it is certainly open to the idea that the decision tree itself is processed 
consciously. 
But there is an alternative possibility. Decision-making can entirely rest on intuition. If this is the 
case, the decision maker not only uses a lot of information to assess whether a certain heuristic is 
applicable. She also takes many elements into account when making the actual decision. Specifi-
cally, she may not only consider multiple cues, but also attach different weights to each of them, 
and allow for cue weights to be changed via the interaction with competing cues (Glöckner 
2007). Ultimately, this is an empirical question. The existing evidence makes it likely that the 
meta-decision how to decide is influenced by the perceived situation and by personality. The 
stronger the time pressure, and the higher the load of competing tasks, the more parsimonious the 
decision rule. And some people, most of the time, prefer relatively simple rules whereas others 
tend to spend more (non-conscious!) effort on the processing of information (Glöckner 2007). 
In functional terms, non-conscious parallel processing of information enables decision-makers to 
use Bayesian statistics (Bolstad 2004). They are thus not confined to using the information to 
which they have access at the moment of decision making. Rather they can use the new informa-
tion to update their provisional knowledge about the environment (Oaksford and Chater 1994). 
They are also able to engage in mental simulation (Stone and Davies 1995). 
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All of this is extremely helpful in navigating a (fundamentally) uncertain environment. The indi-
vidual may find critical situations by looking for outliers: „something is fishy here”. The early 
alert system becomes even more powerful if the individual can quickly check whether single fea-
tures of an otherwise familiar situation are novel, or even similar to the characteristics of a dan-
gerous event. Individuals are able to engage in sense making (Weick 1995), in constructing men-
tal models (Johnson-Laird 1983), and in observational learning (Bandura 1986). They can trans-
pose solutions that have been successful in the past to new situations, once the current problem 
has been identified as sufficiently similar to the earlier one (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1995). They 
can thus exploit the power of associations (Coward 2005:305).  
III.3  Intuition as a Solution to Social Problems 
Occasionally, once one duly accounts for the power of intuition, there is no longer any need for 
institutional intervention. In appropriate circumstances, this even holds for the classic rational 
choice justification for institutional intervention, the prisoner's dilemma. In principle, the di-
lemma persists if the two players are allowed to communicate. It is in the best interest of both of 
them to agree on the cooperative solution. However, this only shifts the original conflict to the 
implementation stage. Once they have agreed, either player is best off if the other is loyal to the 
agreement while she defects. This even holds if the agreement allows the victim, or any member 
of a larger group, to impose a sanction on those who violate the agreement. For punishment is 
costly. Again those are best off who have others do the costly punishing. The original dilemma 
repeats (Heckathorn 1989).  
Lawyers tend to be unconvinced by this story. It clashes with their experience that the conclusion 
of a contract matters, even if the contract cannot be enforced. The experience is particularly pro-
nounced in public international law. Since there is no world government, the enforcement of in-
ternational treaties may often not be taken for granted. Nonetheless states are reluctant to accept 
treaty provisions if they know that they will not want to implement them later on. There are ra-
tional choice explanations for this. States might be afraid that they gain a bad reputation, which 
may be costly in future negotiations. But legal experience seems to point to the fact that there is 
more to it than just repeated or nested games. One possible explanation of the add on fits here. 
It has been demonstrated that people dispose of a very sensitive cheater detection mechanism 
(Cosmides 1989). Further evidence shows that most people hold strong punishing sentiments if 
they suspect others to have cheated on an earlier promise (Fehr and Gächter 2000). The combi-
nation of both mechanisms offers a solution to the prisoner's dilemma. Players are allowed to 
communicate, and to punish free riders. 
Intuition also helps understand a frequent observation from political practice, and from legal dis-
course. Since contestants cannot agree on fundamentals, they content themselves with an „in-
completely theorized agreement“ (Sunstein 1995). They are happy to agree on an outcome, al-
though each of them may hold different convictions as of why it is justified. This may, of course,   14
be due to the fact that each of them is able to give a consistent justification, only starting from 
different premises. However, in legal practice the experience is a different one. Someone sug-
gests a solution. Everyone quickly accepts it as a good one. Conflict breaks out once one of them 
starts giving reasons. After a long and vigorous fight they finally agree to leave reasons aside 
since they still feel happy with the original suggestion for a solution. This line of events can only 
be explained if some contextual, but hard to formulate, elements push the decisions of all of 
them into the same direction.  
This explanation also holds for another frequent observation. Not so rarely, when they learn 
about the latest theoretical achievements in one of the social sciences, lawyers respond: oh yes, 
we have been attentive to this for a hundred years. There have for instance been many legal rules 
taking care of the anti-commons problem before even the term had been coined (Heller 1998). 
This statement is not meant to depreciate the advancement of the social sciences. Being able to 
precisely articulate a problem has value. But the fact that the (legal) solution so often predates 
the precise formulation of the problem can only be explained if, intuitively and hence non-
consciously, legal decision-makers have already grasped the essence of the problem. 
III.4 Intuition  Misled 
While intuition thus is a powerful tool for navigating an uncertain environment, it is not fool-
proof. Intuition can easily be misled. (Experimental) judges have been demonstrated to discount 
pieces of evidence to generate coherence where the material presented to them did not allow for 
this (Simon, Pham et al. 2001). Legal professionals have at most a very small advantage over lay 
people when it comes to telling a credible eyewitness from a lying one. However, they feel much 
more comfortable with their assessment (Sporer 2007). If decision-makers have been exposed to 
a biased sample, they build intuitions that are inappropriate for the true population (cf. Fiedler 
2000). Interested outsiders can specialise in manipulating foreign intuition to their advantage. A 
classic is subliminal advertising, where the target group is primed in favour of buying a product 
without even noticing (Greenwald, Klinger et al. 1995).  
Intuition seems to be much better at finding a locally, rather than a globally acceptable solution. 
Economists for instance claim that non-economists are very bad at capturing multiple, interre-
lated effects, say the co-presence of substitution and income effects (Hellwig 2006). Note that 
the explanation for the phenomenon would not be sheer complexity. Rather the non-conscious 
apparatus would be more or less well prepared to execute some (mildly) complicated mental op-
eration. In this explanation, the problem originates in the fact that socially relevant mental opera-
tions are „counter-intuitive“. This might be due to the fact that individuals are genetically pre-
pared to interpret the situation otherwise. Or they might have acquired this inclination through 
enculturation. 
Intuitive decision-making becomes particularly socially disruptive if individuals have to cooper-
ate whose intuitions clash. The problem is so hard precisely because the individuals do not have   15
access to the underlying mental process. All they have is the result, the intuition, which they 
cannot but believe to be true. The very instance that has served to demonstrate the potential of 
the non-conscious for the solution of social problems also illustrates the most profound risk in 
this. The prisoner's dilemma is overcome if players use intuition to detect cheaters, and are will-
ing to punish them. But what if cheating is a matter of interpretation? In the standard game pre-
sented above, there is no room for ambiguity. Both players have identical endowments. The op-
timal solution for the community of the two players is precisely defined. The game is fully sym-
metrical. Both players know this. It is easy for them to calculate their own payoffs, as well as the 
payoffs of the other player, for each combination of actions. Real life conflicts are hardly ever 
that clean. The potential for gains and losses is distributed asymmetrically (Rapoport and 
Chammah 1965). The players are asymmetrically well informed. The structure of the game, and 
the payoffs are not beyond doubt. The players bring different endowments to the game. 
The cheater detection mechanism rests on assessing fairness. Once one goes away from the clean 
situation, different fairness norms could be applied. Rather than formal equality, desert, entitle-
ment or status could be used (Hoffman and Spitzer 1985; Hoffman, McCabe et al. 1998). De-
pending on which norm is chosen, the definition of cheating would be a different one. Specifi-
cally, while one norm would give one of the players a distributional advantage, a competing one 
frequently would advantage the other player. Take, for instance, an asymmetric game. Is it unfair 
for the player who is advantaged by the structure of the game to insist on the equilibrium solu-
tion? Unfortunately, individuals have a strong self-serving bias in defining the fairness norm. 
Actually, they firmly believe that fairness could only be assessed in this, and in no other way 
(Konow 2005). Their intuition thus traps individuals two times: in picking a fairness norm, and 
in believing that the other player has cheated since she has violated this norm. In such situations, 
conflict is bound to escalate. For the first player feels the urge to punish the „cheater“. This 
player feels treated unfairly, and punishes back (Denant-Boèment, Masclet et al. 2007). 
III.5  Implications for Institutional Design 
In principle, in an uncertain environment, the implications for institutional design are similar to 
the ones sketched for a well-defined problem space. Where intuition is more powerful than con-
scious deliberation, institutions should build trust in intuition. Where intuition risks being misled 
in an individually or socially detrimental way, institutions may choose among one of two aims. 
They may try to induce their addressees to use a less problematic mental mechanism, be that just 
conscious reasoning, or some combination of intuitive and deliberate elements. Or institutions 
may try to shape the environment such that addressees form more appropriate intuitions. The 
problems of control, predictability and regulability are the same as in a well-defined problem 
space, as are potential solutions. 
Suffice it therefore, at this point, to say a word about conflicting intuitions. Social norms have 
been demonstrated to guide people in the formation of not necessarily identical, but coordinated 
fairness norms (Kahan 2005). Formal legal rules could have the same effect if they are properly   16
translated into more contextualised normative expectations (Engel 2004b). Coordinating intui-
tions becomes, of course, the easier, the more homogeneous a society. Responses to perceived 
fundamental uncertainty have been shown to be culturally contingent (Nisbett, Peng et al. 2001; 
Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004). But making societies more homogeneous will usually not be an 
option for policymakers. Shaping the representation of the situation, and organising feedback, 
are at least of some help. 
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